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REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN Canadian manufacturing have attracted a good 
deal of attention in a literature dominated by two conceptual perspectives. The 
"staple" theory popular during the middle decades of this century recognizes the 
influence of location, resource and technology on the growth of manufacturing. 
"Structuralism", which became influential during the 1970s and 1980s, associates 
Maritime development with a loss of local control over political and economic 
decision-making. Still missing from the discussion is a careful documentation of 
the nature and extent of provincial manufacturing differences before the First 
World War. 
This paper presents census data describing early industrial progress in Eastern 
Canada. A brief consideration of this information sharpens our understanding 
of the terrain contested by staple and structuralist interpretations. It is clear that 
important differences existed between Central Canadian and Maritime industry, 
between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and among the various industries. 
The degree of heterogeneity suggests that no single explanation is likely to 
account for all facets of the regional industrial experience. The second part of 
the paper argues that the data do not inspire confidence in the new orthodoxy of 
structuralism and that themes broadly consistent with a staple approach invite 
further consideration. Elements from both analytic traditions are likely to figure 
in an improved explanation for arrested industrialization in Canada's eastern 
periphery.1 
It is useful to begin with a recognition that industrial production in any society 
inevitably reflects the local pattern of settlement. In the 19th century New 
1 In this paper I consider Canada's original four provinces; data are unavailable for other 
provinces during the early part of the period under consideration. I use "industrialization" in the 
sense of a rise in manufacturing share of all commodity production. I thank the many people 
who have influenced the writing of this paper. The most recent draft has benefited from the 
constructive criticism of Morris Altman, Phyllis Wagg, participants in the Economic History 
Workshop at the University of Toronto and the editors and referees of this journal. The Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada funded much of the research on which 
this paper is based. 
Kris E. Inwood, "Marit ime Industrialization from 1870 to 1910: A Review of the 
Evidence and Its Interpretation", Acadiensis, XXI, 1 (Autumn 1991), pp. 132-55. 
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Brunswick and Nova Scotia were thinly settled even by Canadian standards. 
Only 8 per cent of Maritimers lived in census districts with a population density 
exceeding 25 persons per square mile in 1851, against 53 per cent in Quebec and 
75 per cent in Ontario.2 In 1881 the population density of settled areas in the 
Maritimes was one-third that in Quebec and Ontario.3 By 1891, only 20 per cent 
of the Maritime population lived in urban areas against 29 per cent in Quebec 
and 35 per cent in Ontario.4 
The rural nature of society undoubtedly contributed to the less centralized 
pattern of production in the Maritimes. The available evidence for cloth and 
dairy products reported in Table One confirms that on-farm processing was 
more important in the Maritime provinces than in Ontario. Although farm 
households everywhere gradually abandoned manufacturing in order to special-
ize in agricultural production, this change came more slowly in New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia.5 
A belated arrival of the factory system in the Maritimes parallels important 
provincial differences within the factory system. The typical industrial establish-
ment in 1870 was smaller in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick than in Ontario 
(Table Two). Moreover, the size difference increased during the first four 
decades of Confederation. In Nova Scotia, for example, the average factory was 
only two-thirds that of one in Ontario in 1870 and one-half in 1910. The average 
New Brunswick factory was 10 per cent smaller in 1870 and 60 per cent smaller in 
1910. There were exceptions; several industry groups in 1870 New Brunswick 
exceeded their Ontario counterparts in size. On average, however, Maritime 
factories were relatively small in 1870 and even smaller in 1910 particularly in the 
consumer goods sector. 
Maritime mills and shops also tended to be less efficient. New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia labour productivity averaged only three-quarters of the Ontario 
level in 1870 (Table Three). By 1910 relative labour productivity in Nova Scotia 
had changed little while in New Brunswick it had declined dramatically. Capital 
productivity in Nova Scotia was four-fifths of the Ontario level in 1870 and even 
lower in 1900 (Table Four). Capital productivity in New Brunswick, by contrast, 
was comparable to that in Ontario throughout the period. The productivity gap 
tended to be smaller for capital because Maritime firms were more efficient in 
using capital than labour. Maritime productivity was weakest in the consumer 
2 Canada, Census, 1931, vol. 1, Table 6. 
3 O. Sitwell and N. Seifried, The Regional Structure of the Canadian Economy (Toronto, 1984), 
p. 46. 
4 Bill Marr and Don Paterson, Canada: An Economic History (Toronto, 1980), p. 429. 
5 Further discussion of regional differences in domestic textile production is provided by Janine 
Grant and Kris Inwood, "Gender and Organization in the Canadian Cloth Industry", Canadian 
Papers in Business and Economic History, 1 (1989), pp. 17-32. 
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goods industries which in 1910 experienced capital and labour productivity less 
than half that in Ontario. 
Because regions differed in their capital/labour ratio, a comparison of efficiency 
requires the combination of labour and capital in an index of total factor 
productivity (TFP) reported in Table Five. In 1870 Nova Scotia industry appears to 
have been seriously inefficient while the productivity handicap of Quebec and 
New Brunswick was modest. Indeed, certain industry groups in New Brunswick 
rivalled or bettered Ontario efficiency; these tended to be the same industry 
groups in which the average size of establishment exceeded that in Ontario 
(chemicals, clothing, non-ferric metals, paper and transportation equipment). 
The relative position of efficiency among the various provinces changed 
during the following decades. By 1910 Quebec had caught up with Ontario in 
terms of relative provincial efficiency. Maritime chemicals, coal, transportation 
equipment (New Brunswick) and non-ferric metals (Nova Scotia) were relatively 
efficient in 1910 although production was small. On the other hand, inefficiency 
in the large wood and food processing sectors contributed to an overall level of 
total factor productivity only three-quarters of the level in Ontario and Quebec. 
The first forty years of Confederation apparently produced the unhappy result 
that New Brunswick factories fell to a level of relative inefficiency experienced 
by Nova Scotia in 1870, and that Nova Scotia unlike Quebec failed to improve 
its relative position. 
Low labour productivity typically brings with it low wages. For this reason we 
are not surprised to learn that the average factory worker in 1870 earned 14 per 
cent and 17 per cent less in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia than in Ontario. By 
1910 these differences had jumped to 32 per cent and 25 per cent.6 There are 
obvious difficulties with these data because of possible variation in the cost of 
living, payments in kind, composition of workforce, length of working week and 
occupational pluralism. Nevertheless, the general pattern is confirmed by informa-
tion about mill hands and general labourers gathered by immigration agents in 
1890 and by Department of Labour information on carpenters, electricians, 
plumbers and labourers (1901), female cotton spinners (1911) and pulp grinders 
(1913).7 
It appears that Maritime workers worked for relatively low wages before the 
First World War and perhaps as early as 1870.8 But what about their employers? 
6 Canada, Census, 1870-71, vol. 3, Table LIV and Census,19U, vol. 3, Table I. Here I divide the 
total wage bill by the number of workers to obtain a measure of average labour earnings. 
7 M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto, 1965), D40-43, 
D48-51, D90, D96, Dl 17, D127, D204-205 and D206-207. Here the information is a wage per 
worker per unit of time. 
8 Phillip Wood reads the evidence differently; see his "Barriers to Capitalist Development in 
Maritime Canada, 1870-1930: A Comparative Perspective", Canadian Papers in Business 
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Table One 
The Farm Share (%) of All Processing 
BUTTER AND CHEESE WOOLENS AND LINENS 
NS NB PQ ONT NS NB PQ ONT 
1870 100 99 98 84 98 98 69 60 
1890 62 49 47 17 28 19 27 5 
SOURCES: Sources are Canada, Census, 1870, volume 3, Tables XXIV, 
XXXIV and XXXVI and 1891, Tables III and IV; J. Snell, "The Cost of Living in 
Canada in 1870", Histoire sociale/Social History 12 (1979), pp. 186-189; R.H. 
Coats, Wholesale Prices in Canada (Ottawa, 1910), pp. 84-85, 132-34, 136, 290 
and 146-47. In 1870 the price of ticking is used for linen, and the price of tweed 
for woolens. For 1890 Coats supplies the butter and cheese prices; the linen price 
is obtained by scaling the 1870 price with the DBS textile index J38; and the 
woolen price is obtained by scaling an 1897 price with Coats' textile index. 
NOTE: Unless otherwise noted all data underlying this and the following tables 
are taken from volume III of the Canadian censuses of 1870-71, 1890-91 and 
1910-11. The industry groups are those of the 1948 Standard Industrial 
Classification used to organize Canada's early national accounts. I have ignored 
certain industries such as dentistry and painting which were not manufacturing 
activities in any sense. The consumer, durable and intermediate goods sectors 
are my own constructions. Output is calculated as value of production less raw 
materials. All values are in nominal terms; available price indices do not permit 
satisfactory adjustment for regional price differentials or price change over time. 
Note that these data do not support a measure of productivity change from 1870 
to 1910 because (i) there is no adjustment for price change, (ii) the 1910 data 
exclude firms with fewer than five employees which were included in 1870, and 
(iii) capital in 1870 is restricted to fixed capital whereas 1910 encompasses both 
fixed and working capital. The 1910 data at the level of individual industries 
reflect the suppression of information by census authorities concerned to 
preserve confidentiality in districts where fewer than three firms comprised the 
entire industry. 
Did investments in manufacturing pay as well in the Maritimes as they did in 
Ontario? The estimates of profitability reported in Table Six indicate a steady 
History, 1 (1989), pp. 33-58 and "Marxism and the Maritimes: On the Determinants of Regional 
Capitalist Development", Studies in Political Economy, 29 (Summer 1989), pp. 123-53. 
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decline in the rate of profit in New Brunswick from 1870 to 1910, absolutely and 
relative to Ontario and Quebec. Manufacturing in Nova Scotia follows a more 
interesting pattern; profitability was low in 1870 but it had largely recovered by 
1890 after a decade of National Policy expansion. Between 1890 and 1910, 
however, the rate of profit in Nova Scotia as in New Brunswick fell absolutely 
and relative to both Central Canadian provinces. 
The data describing factory size, efficiency and profitability suggest a pattern 
in which /«/ra-regional differences diminished while /«ter-regional differences 
became more pronounced between 1870 and 1910. The indicators for New 
Brunswick in 1870 are not unlike those for Central Canada while Nova Scotia 
industry was noticeably less robust. Nevertheless, Nova Scotia did relatively 
well during the following forty years in contrast to the disastrous experience of 
New Brunswick industry. By 1910 the two provinces had converged toward the 
pattern of industrial weakness familiar in the 20th century. 
Provincial differences in the level and growth of output reported in Tables 
Seven, Eight and Nine follow a similar pattern.9 New Brunswick's level of 
manufacturing activity was within ten per cent of Ontario's in 1870 (Table Nine) 
but it fell increasingly behind in both subsequent sub-periods (Tables Seven and 
Eight). By contrast, the Nova Scotia manufacturing sector started out remarkably 
small but it grew quickly from 1870 to 1890 in the consumer and intermediate 
goods industries. Even in Nova Scotia, however, consumer goods production 
decelerated at a tremendous rate after 1890 while durable goods production 
declined absolutely. 
One point of similarity between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia was the slow 
growth of durable goods production. Over the entire four decades durable goods 
output eked out an increase of 25 per cent in Nova Scotia and 50 per cent in New 
Brunswick; in contrast durable goods output quadrupled in Quebec and Ontario. 
Overall, Ontario increased its strength in consumer goods and durable goods 
while the Maritimes tended to specialize in intermediate goods industries. These 
tendencies were so pronounced that by 1910 Maritime output per capita of 
consumer and durable goods was less than one-quarter that in Ontario. 
Perhaps the most important regional contrast is that Maritime manufacturing 
expanded with equal vigour in the two sub-periods (1870-1890 and 1890-1910) 
whereas Ontario and Quebec manufacturing expanded much more quickly in 
the second interval. Most scholars attribute the acceleration in Canadian economic 
growth to the effect of the wheat boom, a dramatic quickening in the pace of 
Prairie settlement during the 1890s.10 One popular view is that the wheat boom 
9 Growth is examined from 1870 to 1890 and from 1890 to 1910 because the Canadian census 
changed its basis of enumeration after 1890; see Kris Inwood and John Chamard, "Regional 
Industrial Growth in the 1890s: the Case of the Missing Artisans", Acadiensis, XVI, 1 (Autumn 
1986), pp. 101-17. 
10 M.C. Urquhart, "New Estimates of Gross National Product, Canada, 1870 to 1926", in S. 
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Table Two 
Average Output of Industrial Establishments 
all firms 
consumer goods 
durable goods 
intermediate goods 
chemical products 
clothing 
coal & petroleum 
products 
electrical goods 
food & beverages 
iron & steel 
products 
leather & fur 
products 
nonferric metal 
products 
nonmetallic 
mineral products 
printing 
paper products 
rubber goods 
transport equipment 
tobacco products 
textiles 
wood products 
NS 
0.65 
0.71 
0.65 
0.66 
0.47 
0.88 
0.97 
na 
0.51 
0.48 
0.92 
0.92 
2.19 
1.16 
0.23 
na 
1.14 
4.94 
0.23 
0.47 
(relative to Ontario) 
1870 
NB 
0.90 
0.75 
0.78 
1.07 
2.30 
1.54 
0.29 
na 
0.43 
0.80 
0.99 
1.20 
1.59 
0.72 
0.98 
na 
1.17 
0.51 
0.41 
0.95 
PQ 
0.94 
1.19 
0.81 
0.84 
1.61 
1.51 
0.91 
na 
1.08 
0.71 
1.95 
2.38 
1.51 
1.32 
1.74 
10.49 
1.38 
4.78 
0.35 
0.62 
NS 
0.51 
0.26 
0.34 
0.80 
0.52 
0.41 
0.65 
na 
0.25 
0.74 
0.63 
0.29 
0.54 
0.36 
na 
0.01 
0.22 
0.16 
1.05 
0.35 
1910 
NB 
0.41 
0.21 
0.56 
0.65 
0.20 
0.27 
0.91 
na 
0.19 
0.58 
0.72 
0.15 
0.52 
0.48 
0.21 
na 
0.72 
na 
2.31 
0.72 
PQ 
0.72 
0.54 
1.21 
0.96 
1.32 
1.22 
0.69 
1.79 
0.19 
0.80 
1.09 
1.14 
1.17 
1.02 
3.11 
0.20 
2.13 
2.06 
3.36 
0.67 
Engerman and R. Gallman, eds., Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth (Chicago, 
1986), p. 9-88; M. Altman, "A Revision of Canadian Economic Growth: 1870-1910 (a challenge 
to the gradualist interpretation)", Canadian Journal of Economics, XX, 1 (February 1987), pp. 
86-113; Kris Inwood and Thanasis Stengos, "Discontinuities in Canadian Economic Growth, 
1870-1985", Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 28, no. 3 (July 1991), pp. 274-286. 
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influenced the pace of extensive growth but did not bring structural change in 
the sense of an industrial recomposition.11 Nevertheless, the inability of Maritime 
factories to benefit from the wheat boom created structural change of a different 
kind involving a locational shift of production within Eastern Canada. 
The importance of the wheat boom depends somewhat upon one's choice of 
conceptual framework. Scholars influenced by the staple perspective view the 
wheat boom as a prime example of the importance of natural resources and 
location. Structuralists, on the other hand, have tended to ignore the direct 
impact of the wheat boom on the Canadian market for manufactures.12 The 
structuralist literature combines the tradition of regional economic grievance 
with the social science ideology of dependency to argue that political and financial 
control by outsiders undermined regional interests.13 Although diverse, the 
11 Alan Green and M.C. Urquhart, "New Estimates of Output Growth in Canada: Measurement 
and Interpretation", in Douglas McCalla, ed., Perspectives on Canadian Economic History 
(Toronto, 1987), pp. 182-199; Gordon Bertram, "Economic Growth and Canadian Industry, 
1870-1915: The Staple Model and the Takeoff Hypothesis", Canadian Journal of Economics 
and Political Science, XXIX (1963), pp. 159-84. Morris Altman has argued that adjustments for 
price change provide greater evidence of structural change; see his "A Revision of Canadian 
Economic Growth". Useful perspective is brought to bear on the debate by Ken Norrie and 
Doug Owram, A History of the Canadian Economy (Toronto, 1991), pp. 293-298, 329-333 and 
359-368. 
12 Influential contributions by historians include T.W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the 
Industrialization of the Maritimes", Acadiensis, 1,2 (Spring 1972), pp. 1-28 and "The Maritimes 
and Empire Canada" in David Bercuson, ed., Canada and the Burden of Unity (Toronto, 1977), 
pp. 87-114; E.R. Forbes, The Maritimes Rights Movement (Toronto, 1977) and "Misguided 
Symmetry: The Destruction of Regional Transportation Policy for the Maritimes", pp. 60-86 in 
Bercuson, ed., Canada and the Burden; David Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the 
Rise and Fall of the British Empire Steel Corporation", Acadiensis, VII, 1 (Autumn 1977), pp. 
3-34; James Frost, "The Nationalization of The Bank of Nova Scotia", Acadiensis, XII, 1 
(Autumn 1982), pp. 3-38; Greg Kealey, Ian McKay and Nolan Reilly, "Canada's 'Eastern 
Question': A Reader's Guide to Regional Underdevelopment", Canadian Dimension, Vol. 13, 
No. 2 (1978), pp. 37-40. Contributions from social science include R. J. Brym and J. Sacouman, 
eds., Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada (Toronto, 1979); Michael 
Clow, "Politics and Uneven Development: The Maritime Challenge to the Study of Canadian 
Political Economy", Studiesin Political Economy, 14(Fall 1984), pp. 117-40 and his "Situating 
a Classic: Saunders Revisited", Acadiensis, XV, 1 (Autumn 1985), pp. 145-52; Ralph Matthews, 
The Creation of Regional Dependency (Toronto, 1983). 
13 Keith Griffin and John Gurley, "Radical Analyses of Imperialism, the Third World and the 
Transition to Socialism, Journal of Economic Literature, XXIII, 3 (September 1988), pp. 
1089-1143; Cristobal Kay, Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment 
(New York, 1989); S. Lall, "Is Dependency a Useful Concept in Analyzing Underdevelopment?", 
World Development, 3, nos. 11-12 (1975), pp. 799-810; Patrick O'Brien, "A Critique of Latin 
American Theories of Dependency", in I. Oxaal, et al, eds., Beyond the Sociology of Development 
(London, 1975), pp. 7-27; Alec Nove, "On Reading Andre Gunder Frank", Journal of Development 
Studies, 10, nos. 3-4 (April-July 1974), pp. 445-55 and Eric Sager, "Dependency, Underdevelopment 
and the Economic History of the Atlantic Provinces", Acadiensis, XVII, 1 (Autumn 1987), pp. 
117-37.1 borrow the term "structuralism" from the Latin American literature; see Joseph Love, 
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Table Three 
Labour Productivity ($ value added/worker), 1870 and 1910 
all firms 
consumer 
goods 
durable goods 
intermediate 
goods 
chemical 
products 
clothing 
coal&petrol 
products 
electrical 
goods 
food&bev 
iron&steel 
products 
leather&fur 
products 
non-ferric 
NS 
419 
490 
437 
363 
569 
368 
2196 
na 
589 
447 
513 
550 
metal products 
nonmetallic 
min products 
printing 
397 
755 
paper products 609 
rubber goods 
transport 
equipment 
tobacco 
products 
textiles 
wood 
products 
na 
462 
727 
371 
274 
NB 
432 
408 
468 
424 
1496 
333 
1018 
na 
479 
561 
488 
769 
307 
591 
774 
na 
487 
205 
434 
373 
1870 
PQ 
487 
503 
463 
487 
1403 
430 
1472 
na 
1092 
504 
523 
524 
407 
553 
646 
285 
403 
647 
487 
368 
ONT 
574 
572 
558 
591 
986 
350 
3226 
na 
1443 
598 
497 
631 
326 
641 
730 
2250 
559 
380 
486 
429 
NS 
925 
570 
831 
1102 
654 
644 
3662 
na 
498 
1039 
981 
946 
662 
878 
na 
237 
859 
1024 
611 
629 
1910 
NB 
683 
535 
908 
700 
765 
597 
2279 
na 
441 
1011 
1119 
492 
555 
862 
474 
na 
988 
na 
670 
590 
PQ 
1053 
1014 
1063 
1087 
1437 
809 
3789 
1704 
1110 
1230 
985 
842 
1127 
1001 
1178 
1512 
876 
1351 
938 
730 
ONT 
1182 
1292 
1056 
1182 
1739 
779 
2962 
1156 
1980 
1177 
1427 
1112 
1153 
1073 
1017 
2125 
983 
1523 
812 
932 
"The Origins of Dependency Analysis", Journal of Latin American Studies, 11, no. 1 (February 
1990), pp. 143-68. 
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literature tends to focus on the loss of local control over public policy and 
private enterprise following Confederation, which is viewed as a "critical turning 
point" for the region.14 
Evidence supporting or contradicting the 'turning point' hypothesis is elusive 
since the first good census in British North America was not undertaken until 
three years after the alleged turning point. Nevertheless, there is some evidence 
that the manufacturing lag antedates Confederation; Inwood and Chamard 
have reported that Maritime industrial employment lagged in six large industries 
during the 1850s and 1860s even after adjusting for differing provincial rates of 
population growth.15 
Confidence in the turning point hypothesis is further undermined by evidence 
reported above that as early as 1870 Maritime factories were small, unproduc-
tive in their use of capital and labour, paid low wages and, at least in Nova 
Scotia, relatively unprofitable. New Brunswick manufacturing was more robust 
in 1870 but even its per capita output was noticeably less than that in Ontario. 
Obviously, the political union cannot be blamed for something which preceded it. 
It remains possible, however, that the policies of the new Canadian government 
may have made matters worse than they otherwise would have been. According 
to this line of argument, an inward-looking or continentalist Central Canada 
dominated the political union and established policies unsuitable for an outward-
looking Maritime region. But what policies? During the first few years of 
Confederation the national government spent heavily in the Maritimes in order 
to construct the Intercolonial Railway. It is difficult to discern a spending bias 
against the Maritimes in this period, although a careful regional accounting of 
expenditures by various government departments might alter this judgement. 
A more persistent controversy surrounds changes in the tax or tariff on 
manufactured imports. The tariff acts as a subsidy to manufacturing and hence 
to any region in which manufacturing predominates or has the potential to grow. 
The first effect of political union in 1867 was to abolish tariffs on trade between 
the Maritimes and the Canadas. Although it is at least possible that Maritime 
factories suffered through a Confederation-related change in protection, any 
effect along these lines cannot have been large since tariffs were relatively low 
before and immediately after 1867.16 
14 David Alexander, "Economic Growth in the Atlantic Region, 1880-1940", Acadiensis, VIII, 1 
(Autumn 1978), p. 47. See also Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1879, pp. 1306-8 and 
Phillip Buckner, P. B. Waite and William Baker, "The Maritimes and Confederation: A 
Reassessment", Canadian Historical Review, LXXI, 1 (March 1990), pp. 1-45. 
15 Inwood and Chamard, "Regional Growth during the 1890s", Table Four. The industries are 
tanning, foundries and machine shops, brewing and various mills (carding, fulling, weaving, 
saw, flour and grist). Regrettably, shipbuilding is not represented. 
16 S.A. Saunders, The Economic History of the Maritime Provinces (Fredericton, 1984, [1939]). 
p. 25. 
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Table Four 
Capital Productivity ($ value added/$ capital), 1870 and 1910 
NS 
all firms 1.08 
consumer goods 1.56 
durable goods 1.67 
intermediate goods 0.67 
chemical products 0.71 
clothing 1.69 
coal & petroleum 0.24 
products 
electrical goods na 
food & beverages 0.79 
iron & steel 1.07 
products 
leather & fur 1.61 
products 
nonferric metal 1.13 
products 
nonmetallic 0.55 
mineral products 
printing 1.09 
paper products 0.70 
rubber goods na 
transport 2.39 
equipment 
tobacco products3.58 
textiles 0.61 
wood products 0.88 
NB 
1.32 
2.55 
2.34 
0.95 
1.25 
5.00 
0.14 
na 
0.87 
1.66 
1.85 
2.35 
1.22 
1.37 
1.46 
na 
3.35 
4.76 
0.71 
1.07 
PQ 
1.15 
1.48 
1.37 
0.88 
0.91 
1.41 
0.25 
na 
0.77 
1.34 
2.07 
0.92 
2.00 
0.77 
1.06 
0.31 
1.24 
1.95 
0.78 
1.09 
ONT 
1.31 
1.65 
1.66 
0.96 
1.07 
2.18 
1.18 
na 
1.15 
1.66 
2.00 
1.54 
2.42 
1.24 
0.70 
7.50 
1.64 
2.15 
0.75 
1.04 
NS 
0.33 
0.50 
0.42 
0.30 
1.01 
0.44 
0.20 
na 
0.53 
0.55 
0.60 
1.32 
0.30 
0.47 
na 
0.99 
0.29 
2.16 
0.23 
0.56 
NB 
0.47 
0.73 
1.06 
0.37 
1.11 
1.50 
0.27 
na 
0.65 
0.55 
0.63 
0.59 
0.73 
0.67 
0.49 
na 
4.16 
na 
0.29 
0.37 
PQ 
0.51 
0.52 
0.78 
0.41 
0.51 
1.06 
0.11 
0.71 
0.45 
0.57 
0.57 
0.45 
0.59 
0.43 
0.34 
1.23 
1.17 
0.48 
0.39 
0.39 
ONT 
0.47 
0.67 
0.46 
0.36 
0.46 
0.89 
0.15 
0.39 
0.67 
0.38 
0.58 
0.50 
0.65 
0.59 
0.45 
0.65 
0.61 
1.14 
0.35 
0.46 
Much has been made of the 1879 shift in Canadian government policy which 
systematically increased the Canadian tariff on manufactured imports as part of 
a new "National Policy". Canadian historians commonly assume that tariff 
changes allowed the domestic price of manufactured goods to rise and that 
domestic firms substituted their output for imported goods. This view credits the 
National Policy with responsibility for a manufacturing boom during the early 
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1880s and perhaps a permanently faster rate of industrial growth. Maritime 
firms contributed some of the extra output in the short term. It would not be 
surprising that Maritime interests benefitted from the tariff since powerful 
Maritime politicians dominated the finance ministry during the 1880s and 1890s 
and gave regional interests a voice in the delicate negotiations over tariff structure. 
In the longer run, however, increases in domestic production came dispropor-
tionately from Central Canada. 
Why did Ontario manufacturing come to dominate the tariff-bound Canadian 
market? One answer might be that Ontario was more industrialized and hence 
enjoyed the advantages of a more developed industrial infrastructure. Support 
for this answer is undermined, however, by the evidence of Table Ten that 
Ontario was no more industrialized than the Maritimes in 1870. Another answer 
suggested by the structuralist literature is that Canadian manufacturing 
over-expanded as a short term response to the National Policy tariffs. Subsequent 
rationalization of capacity provided an opportunity for ownership to concentrate. 
As part of this process Central Canadians acquired control of Maritime plants and 
shut them down. The regional economy suffered unfairly in the rationalization 
because Central Canadian owners trimmed their excess capacity with a regional 
bias.17 
This argument comes in two parts — that tariffs were responsible for output 
growth and that ownership changes caused industry to relocate. The first part 
suffers from a difficulty that characterizes almost all discussion of the 19th 
century tariff. Economic historians have been remarkably unsuccessful in identifying 
Canadian industries which were significantly affected by the tariff.18 The 
fundamental problem is a lack of evidence indicating that the tariff really mattered. 
Maritime manufacturing provides a useful example here. We might be tempted 
to credit the tariff with Nova Scotia's fast manufacturing growth from 1870 to 
1890. It is equally plausible, however, that Nova Scotia was experiencing a kind 
of "catch-up" from a low level of activity in 1870 because of improved railway 
services, because the coal trade was growing so quickly or because 1870 was an 
unusually bad year for Nova Scotia business. Without a careful study of individual 
industries, it is difficult to make firm conclusions about the impact of the 
tariff.19 
17 Acheson, "The Maritimes and Empire Canada" and Henry Veltmeyer, "The Capitalist Under-
development of Atlantic Canada" in Brym and Sacouman, eds., Underdevelopment and Social 
Movements in Atlantic Canada, pp. 37-58. 
18 John Dales, The Protective Tariff in Canada's Economic Development (Toronto, 1966) and 
'"National Policy' Myths, Past and Present", Journal of Canadian Studies, 14 (Fall 1979), pp. 
39-50; Ian Drummond, Progress without Planning (Toronto 1987), pp. 112-14; Kris Inwood, 
The Canadian Charcoal Iron Industry (New York, 1986), pp. 46-51. 
19 Lou Cain, "Ontario's Industrial Revolution", Canadian Historical Review, LXIX, 3 (1988), pp. 
300-307. 
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Table Five 
Total Factor Productivity Relative to Ontario, 1870 and 1910 
all firms 
consumer goods 
durable goods 
intermediate goods 
chemical products 
clothing 
coal & petroleum 
products 
electrical goods 
food & beverages 
Relative TFP 1870 
NS 
0.78 
0.90 
0.87 
0.66 
0.61 
0.90 
0.25 
na 
0.61 
iron & steel products 0.70 
leather & fur products 
nonferric metal 
products 
nonmetallic mineral 
products 
printing 
paper products 
rubber goods 
transport equipment 
tobacco products 
textiles 
wood products 
0.91 
0.81 
0.56 
1.04 
0.92 
na 
1.06 
1.86 
0.79 
0.73 
NB 
0.88 
1.09 
1.05 
0.86 
1.35 
1.50 
0.14 
na 
0.62 
0.97 
0.95 
1.35 
0.70 
0.99 
1.55 
na 
1.26 
0.70 
0.92 
0.94 
PQ 
0.86 
0.89 
0.83 
0.88 
1.13 
0.88 
0.24 
na 
0.69 
0.83 
1.04 
0.72 
1.03 
0.75 
1.19 
0.07 
0.74 
1.52 
1.02 
0.95 
Relative TFP 1910 
NS 
0.74 
0.59 
0.83 
0.88 
1.14 
0.68 
1.30 
na 
0.57 
1.09 
0.86 
1.61 
0.51 
0.81 
na 
0.67 
0.71 
0.88 
0.70 
0.88 
NB 
0.77 
0.71 
1.27 
0.77 
1.28 
1.04 
1.41 
na 
0.64 
1.09 
0.94 
0.77 
0.77 
0.91 
0.71 
na 
1.93 
na 
0.83 
0.71 
PQ 
0.99 
0.78 
1.23 
1.02 
0.99 
1.09 
0.86 
1.55 
0.64 
1.03 
0.84 
0.83 
0.94 
0.86 
0.94 
1.39 
1.16 
0.73 
1.13 
0.81 
NOTE: Total factor productivity (TFP) is a weighted average of labour and capital 
productivity. I define relative TFP as labour productivity in one province relative to that 
in Ontario and raised to the power of the labour share of factor costs, multiplied by 
capital productivity in one province relative to that in Ontario and raised to the power of 
the capital share of factor costs; see W.E. Diewert, "Exact and Superlative Index Numbers", 
Journal of Econometrics, 4 (May 1976), pp. 115-145. Factor costs are computed as total 
value of production less raw material costs and imputed miscellaneous costs. The latter 
are assumed to be the same ratio to total product for each industry group in 1870 and 1910 
as they were in 1900, in which year the census report on manufacturing was particularly 
detailed. Shares are calculated by industry group. The labour share derives from reported 
wages and salaries; the capital share is a residual derived from total factor costs less 
labour. The residual capital share may be overestimated because miscellaneous costs are 
likely to be underestimated. This would imply a bias to portray Maritime factories as 
being more efficient than they actually were, since Maritime factories tended to make 
more productive use of capital than labour. I follow the published census in using fixed 
capital in 1870 and both fixed and working capital in 1910. 
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Another line of argument might draw upon the economics of international 
trade for an analysis of regional welfare effects.20 Unfortunately, these tech-
niques are of doubtful relevance to our problem since capital and labour were 
mobile among sectors and regions, factor endowment in 1870 does not appear to 
have differed markedly between Ontario and the Maritimes, and there is no 
evidence of sectoral differences in factor proportions. Use of traditional trade 
analysis is further limited by the common structure shared by Ontario and the 
Maritimes; both regions exported primary products, imported manufactures 
and shortly after Confederation had a manufacturing sector accounting for 
approximately one-third of all commodity production (Table Ten). 
The second part of the argument suggests that there may be some connection 
between ownership change and industrial relocation. This is difficult to sustain 
in part because we know so little about ownership. No systematic evidence is 
available to support the presumption of an ownership shift at the end of the 19th 
century. Indeed, evidence of capital outflow and the career patterns of Maritime 
promoters suggest that local capital may have increased its influence over firms 
outside the region during the late 19th century, rather than the reverse.21 The 
presumed shift in ownership might have been linked to an apparent decline in 
Maritime output during the 1890s, but the linkage would be spurious since the 
appearance of output decline (relative and absolute) during the 1890s is an 
artifact created by enumeration changes which introduced a regional bias into 
census data.22 
The argument is flawed more fundamentally by its implied portrait of capitalists 
and capital markets. The pursuit of profit led Canadians in this period to invest 
in a wide variety of enterprise throughout Canada, in Latin America and Europe.23 
There seems little reason to think that they would have avoided investment in 
Maritime factories if there had been some reasonable anticipation of profit. But 
how profitable were these factories? Evidence reported in Table Four suggests 
that Nova Scotia factories were less profitable in 1870, and that throughout the 
region relative profitability deteriorated after 1890. It is difficult to resist the 
conclusion that poor profitability undermined the willingness of Maritime 
20 James Markusen and James Melvin, The Theory of International Trade and its Canadian 
Applications (Toronto, 1984), pp. 384-90. 
21 Chris Armstrong, "Making a Market: Selling Securities in Atlantic Canada before World War 
I", Canadian Journal of Economics, XIII, 3 (August 1980), pp. 438-54; Neil Quigley, "Bank 
Credit and the Structure of the Canadian Space Economy, 1890-1935", Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Toronto, 1986. 
22 Inwood and Chamard, "Regional Industrial Growth". I circumvent this problem in the present 
paper by reporting data for 1870-1890 and 1890-1910. 
23 Armstrong, "Making a Market"; Greg Marchildon, "Promotion, Finance and Merger in the 
Canadian Manufacturing Industry, 1885-1918", Ph.D. thesis, The London School of Economics 
and Political Science, 1990. 
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Table Six 
Estimated Profitability in Manufacturing 
NS NB PQ ONT 
1870 
production 12338 17368 77205 114707 
return to capital 1881 2589 14153 18735 
capital 11159 9439 56813 81725 
profitability 0.17 0.27 0.25 0.23 
1890 
production 30968 23850 147460 239242 
return to capital 4569 3018 17111 40002 
capital 19823 15823 118292 175972 
profitability 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.23 
1910 
production 52706 35422 350902 579810 
return to capital 9020 5179 57709 109784 
capital 79596 36125 326947 595395 
profitability 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.18 
NOTE: Profitability is estimated as the ratio of profit (the value of production 
less labour, material, depreciation and miscellaneous costs) to capital invested. 
All values are reported by the census except depreciation which is calculated at 
10 per cent of physical capital, miscellaneous costs which are taken to be same 
share of product value in 1870 and 1910 as they had been in 1900, 1870 working 
capital which is taken to be the same share of total capital as in 1890 and salaries 
are imputed in 1870 and 1890 in the same proportion to wages as they were 
reported in 1910. This method of estimating profitability is described in more 
detail elsewhere; see F. Bateman and T. Weiss, A Deplorable Scarcity: The 
Failure of Industrialization in the Slave Economy (Chapel Hill, 1981), Appendix C. 
business to borrow at rates acceptable to Ontario business and thereby directed 
Maritime savings into extra-regional investments.24 If this is correct, then the 
24 Armstrong, "Making a Market"; Quigley, "Bank Credit". 
146 Acadiensis 
well-documented capital outflow simply reflects a dearth of good investment 
opportunities within the region. 
Of course, we might seek to explain the poor profitability in the Maritimes in 
other ways. Structuralists suggest that the Canadian government increased 
freight rates on the Intercolonial Railway in 1912 and 1917, and in so doing hurt 
Maritime manufacturing.25 Unfortunately, little is known about Intercolonial 
costs and pricing. By 19th century standards the Intercolonial carried relatively 
few passengers and less freight. The low density of traffic possibly made it 
difficult to implement technological advances enjoyed by other North American 
railways, in which case shipping from Maritime factories to the Ontario market 
would have been costly.26 But a dearth of relevant evidence makes it difficult to 
evaluate the contribution of other influences such as pricing by competing 
carriers (water and rail) and government policy. Although further research is 
needed, one point already is clear. The changes alleged to have handicapped 
Maritime manufacturers came too late to explain a regional lag that originated 
in the 19th century. The 1912 and 1917 policy decisions may have aggravated an 
already difficult situation for local manufacturing, but they could not have been 
the sole cause. 
The influence of transportation, tariffand other factors is easier to discern for 
individual industries than for the manufacturing sector as a whole. Advocates of 
the structuralist perspective have pioneered consideration of an important case 
study, the steel and coal industry. In this industry Nova Scotia companies 
participated in a tariff-assisted expansion of Canadian capacity between 1890 
and 1910. In the latter year the local owners of a profitable regional firm 
successfully thwarted a hostile takeover bid by Central Canadian promoters: 
Ten years later a second takeover bid by British interests was successful. Almost 
immediately the Nova Scotia steel industry plunged into a disastrous period of 
contraction and wage reduction. The drain of capital out of the region allegedy 
was facilitated by the watering of stock during the early 1920s.27 
The story of Maritime steel and coal has been interpreted as an example of 
de-industrialization on the periphery resulting from the loss of local control. 
From this perspective, the regional industry was a casualty in the international 
concentration and centralization of capital. However, an alternate interpretation of 
the industry is available. In this view corporate re-organization in the Nova 
Scotia steel industry was a belated and largely unsuccessful effort to salvage 
firms already facing bankruptcy.28 A small scale of operations, diminishing 
25 Forbes, Maritime Rights and "Misguided Symmetry". 
26 Ken Cruikshank, "The Transportation Revolution and its Consequences", Communications 
historiques/ Historical Papers (1987), pp. 112-37. 
27 Acheson, "The National Policy"; Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry". 
28 Kris Inwood, "Local Control, Resources and the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company", 
Communications historiques/Historical Papers (1986), pp. 254-82. 
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Table Seven 
Percentage Change in Manufacturing Output 1870-1890 
all factories 
farm production 
all manufacturing 
consumer goods 
durable goods 
intermediate goods 
chemical products 
clothing 
coal & petroleum products 
electrical goods 
food & beverages 
iron & steel products 
leather & fur products 
nonferric metal products 
nonmetallic mineral products 
printing 
paper products 
rubber goods 
transport equipment 
tobacco products 
textiles 
wood products 
NS 
128 
60 
120 
160 
30 
214 
210 
224 
164 
na 
361 
142 
-1 
348 
114 
54 
48 
na 
3 
-78 
505 
213 
NB 
42 
67 
44 
95 
-10 
50 
03 
49 
321 
na 
292 
21 
-12 
204 
121 
111 
-52 
na 
-38 
64 
443 
21 
PQ 
104 
50 
101 
100 
83 
120 
149 
125 
365 
na 
122 
92 
50 
191 
186 
86 
313 
202 
154 
162 
406 
64 
ONT 
116 
34 
113 
119 
61 
162 
410 
277 
-5 
na 
82 
90 
41 
854 
215 
177 
254 
4311 
26 
265 
150 
143 
NOTE: Farm output includes butter, cheese and cloth only. I have adjusted the 
1870 data for missing data on railway workshops; see P. Craven and T. Traves, 
"Canadian Railways as Manufacturers, 1850-1880", Communications historiques/ 
Historical Papers {19^), pp. 254-281. In order to make the adjustment I assume 
that the capital/labour ratio was the same for unreported as for reported firms 
and that labour productivity in the Great Western's Hamilton shop was identical 
with that of the Grand Trunk in its Brantford shop. 
resources and distance to market undermined profits and contributed to a 
declining share of national output long before the first takeover bid. Capital 
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drain via stock-watering was impossible since there seldom was sufficient profit 
to pay dividends. The Nova Scotia firms faced much more fundamental problems 
as mining costs rose in a time of excess capacity worldwide and decreased 
domestic demand.29 
International market conditions and a rising cost of extraction would have 
brought hard times to the Nova Scotia coal fields regardless of ownership and 
organizational arrangements. It is possible of course that the industry would 
have adapted more effectively to its difficult circumstances under local ownership. 
However, this conjecture has not yet been investigated. Careful examination of 
other industries one day may provide stronger support for the structuralist 
perspective, but the case will have to be made. 
The structuralist failure to account for many aspects of Maritime manufacturing 
before the First World War redirects attention to the staple theory, an older 
explanatory tradition emphasizing the adverse effect of resource characteristics 
and technological developments.30 Several key developments figure in most 
staple accounts of Maritime development.31 Thin soil, a short growing season 
and lack of a nearby urban market hampered agricultural adjustment in the 
Maritimes during the 19th century.32 Technological change in ocean shipping 
undermined local wooden shipbuilding and shipping industries.33 The eclipse of 
cane by beet sugar doomed the West Indies trade.34 Limited waterpower and 
29 Barry Supple, "The Political Economy of Demoralization: the State and the Coal-mining 
Industry in America and Britain between the Wars", Economic History Review, XLI, 4 (November 
1988), pp. 566-91. 
30 Douglas North, "Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth", Journal of Political 
Economy, LXIII (February-December 1955), pp. 243-58 and The Economic Growth of the 
United States, 1790-1860 (New York, 1966); A. D. Scott, "Policy for Declining Regions: A 
Theoretical Approach", in W.D. Wood and R.S. Thoman, eds., Areas of Economic Stress in 
Canada (Kingston, 1965), pp. 73-93; R. Caves and R. Holton, The Canadian Economy: Prospect 
and Retrospect (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 141-95; Boris Schedvin, "Staples and Regions of Pax 
Britannica", Economic History Review, XLIII, 4 (November 1990), pp. 533-59. 
31 A. Blackbourn and R. Putnam, The Industrial Geography of Canada (London, 1984), Chapter 
7; Caves and Holton, The Canadian Economy, p. 145; A.W. Currie, Canadian Economic 
Development, (Toronto, 1942), p. 131; CR. Fay and H.A. Innis, "The Economic Development 
of Canada 1867-1921: The Maritime Provinces", in The Cambridge History of the British 
Empire, Volume VI (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 657-71; Harold Innis, Essays in Canadian Economic 
History (Toronto, 1956), pp. 148, 226 and 349; R.C. Harris and J. Warkentin, Canada Before 
Confederation (New York, 1974), pp. 208-10; L. D. McCann, "Staples and the New Industrialism", 
Acadiensis, VIII, 2 (Spring 1979), pp. 47-79; S. A. Saunders, The Economic History and The 
Economic Welfare of the Maritime Provinces (Wolfville, 1932). 
32 Currie, Canadian Economic Development, p. 123. 
33 Eric Sager and Lewis R. Fischer, "Atlantic Canada and the Age of Sail Revisited", Canadian 
Historical Review, LXIII, 2 (June 1982), pp. 126-150; Eric Sager and Gerald Panting, Maritime 
Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914 (Kingston and Montreal, 1990). 
34 W.A. Mackintosh, The Economic Background to Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa, 
1939), p. 34. 
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Table Eight 
Percentage Change in Output of Factories 
Employing Five or More Workers, 1890-1910 
NS NB PQ ONT 
factories with more 
than 5 employees 129 78 187 214 
consumer goods 
durable goods 
intermediate goods 
chemical products 
clothing 
coal & petroleum products 
electrical goods 
food & beverages 
iron & steel products 
leather & fur products 
nonferric metal products 
nonmetallic mineral products 
printing 
paper products 
rubber goods 
transport equipment 
tobacco products 
textiles 
wood products 
26 
-4 
248 
-11 
-45 
224 
-100 
16 
101 
47 
6 
-56 
99 
-100 
na 
-33 
-7 
-2 
38 
48 
68 
92 
-71 
26 
377 
na 
39 
65 
86 
-65 
-19 
73 
150 
na 
172 
-100 
29 
72 
184 
214 
171 
227 
237 
139 
2435 
64 
132 
103 
173 
33 
163 
478 
18 
162 
315 
202 
134 
277 
260 
142 
319 
165 
615 
1288 
228 
279 
315 
373 
196 
193 
309 
1332 
340 
351 
30 
93 
SOURCE: K. Inwood and J. Chamard, "Regional Industrial Growth in the 
1890s: the Case of the Missing Artisans", Acadiensis, XVI, 1 (Autumn 1986), pp. 
101-117. 
hydroelectric potential impeded the diffusion of new industrial technologies,35 
as did the small size of local market. The decline of the fishing industry during 
35 Peter Wylie, "When Markets Fail: Electrification and Maritime Industrial Decline", Acadien-
sis, XVII, I (Autumn 1987), pp. 74-96. 
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the early 20th century in spite of increased prices suggests either a reduction in 
accessible stocks or the withdrawal of labour for some other reason.36 Diminishing 
returns and rising costs undermined the region's coal and steel industries.37 The 
Maritimes had no natural hinterland; a location south of the St. Lawrence River 
and north of the great east-west rail routes brought little stimulus from the 
booming trade between the North American interior and Europe.38 Finally, it is 
argued that the major primary products in the Maritimes did not sustain as much 
processing as in Central Canada, either because of the intrinsic characteristics of 
a product or because it could not be produced locally at a competitive cost.39 
A systematic evaluation of these arguments is not possible with summary 
information of the sort available in this paper. Nevertheless, the impact of 
resource availability is visible in the data reported in Table Nine. New Brunswick's 
per capita output among wood-using industries was very high in 1870 because of 
local timber availability, just as Ontario's strength in food and beverage manufacturing 
reflected that province's excellent supply of farm products. Maritime industrial 
growth after 1870 was strongest in the Nova Scotia coal belt in part because of a 
strong demand for coal originating in the substitution of coal and steel in a wide 
variety of industrial applications.40 Another development reflected in these data 
was the replacement of Great Britain by the United States as the source of fuel, 
machinery and semi-finished iron used by Canadian industries. Manufacturers 
in Montreal and the Maritimes were favoured as long as these imports originated in 
Britain. When American supplies displaced the British late in the century 
south-western Ontario acquired the locational advantage.41 
A full evaluation of these suggestions will require precise information about 
regional price differentials that is not yet available. It is also suggested that 
resource availability limited the size and population density of the region, which 
in turn prevented Maritime factories from adopting new technologies requiring 
a large scale of production. Research using American data permit a preliminary 
consideration of this point. Jeremy Atack has used census data to identify the 
36 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Maritime Provinces since Confederation (Ottawa, 
1929), p. 56. 
37 Inwood, "Local Control". 
38 Saunders, The Economic History, p. 24. 
39 Caves and Holton, Canada, p. 180. 
40 Inwood and Chamard, "Regional Industrial Growth". 
41 Kris Inwood, "Transportation, Tariffs and the Canadian Iron Industry", University of Guelph 
Economics Working Paper 89-3 (1989). The point is more often made in the literature on 
Quebec; see A. Faucher and M. Lamontagne, "History of Industrial Development", in C. 
Falardeau, ed., Essays on Contemporary Quebec (Quebec, 1953), p. 23-37 and Morris Altman, 
"Resource Endowments and Location Theory: A Case Study of Quebec and Ontario at the 
Turn of the Twentieth Century", Journal of Economic History, XLVI, 4 (December 1986), pp. 
999-1009. 
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Table Nine 
Per Capita Manufacturing Output ($), 1870 and 1910 
all factories 
farm production 
total 
consumer goods 
durable goods 
intermediate goods 
chemical products 
clothing 
coal & petroleum 
products 
electrical goods 
food & beverages 
iron & steel 
products 
leather & fur 
products 
nonferric metal 
products 
NS 
16.76 
2.01 
18.77 
4.25 
6.61 
5.90 
0.19 
0.83 
0.23 
0.00 
1.34 
2.47 
2.65 
0.12 
nonmetallic mineral 0.87 
products 
printing 
paper products 
rubber goods 
transport equipment 
tobacco products 
textiles 
wood products 
0.51 
0.01 
0.00 
3.28 
0.49 
0.36 
3.41 
NB 
27.66 
2.00 
29.66 
5.27 
7.56 
14.83 
0.63 
1.62 
0.12 
0.00 
1.38 
3.90 
2.88 
0.31 
0.64 
0.50 
0.14 
0.00 
3.41 
0.05 
0.66 
11.35 
P Q 
27.48 
1.93 
29.41 
10.31 
6.31 
10.85 
0.57 
2.08 
0.21 
0.00 
3.47 
3.63 
5.37 
0.44 
0.85 
0.72 
0.24 
0.12 
1.80 
0.64 
0.58 
6.31 
ONT 
31.41 
1.33 
32.74 
9.76 
10.11 
11.54 
0.22 
1.98 
1.09 
0.00 
6.32 
5.72 
2.99 
0.19 
0.83 
0.89 
0.16 
0.00 
2.52 
0.17 
1.40 
6.79 
NS 
54.13 
9.18 
5.40 
39.54 
0.30 
0.82 
1.52 
0.00 
5.88 
6.52 
1.29 
0.17 
0.59 
0.94 
0.00 
0.04 
1.50 
0.08 
1.37 
9.78 
NB 
48.04 
9.67 
7.82 
30.55 
0.10 
1.57 
1.98 
0.00 
5.44 
4.64 
1.94 
0.17 
0.89 
1.45 
0.13 
0.00 
3.93 
0.00 
3.55 
18.09 
P Q 
83.02 
31.51 
19.55 
31.96 
2.30 
7.41 
1.39 
2.23 
6.58 
7.46 
8.20 
1.52 
1.85 
2.01 
3.46 
0.25 
6.42 
4.12 
4.87 
12.77 
ONT 
111.67 
43.67 
31.30 
36.69 
2.45 
9.31 
4.24 
1.66 
21.03 
20.90 
6.06 
2.79 
4.53 
4.19 
1.43 
1.06 
6.44 
1.66 
2.71 
18.19 
scale of production needed to minimize production cost in 1870 American 
factories.42 In a wide range of industries the minimum efficient size identified by 
Atack was considerably larger than the average Maritime factory.43 This comparison 
recommends further consideration of the possibility that Maritime factories 
were inefficient because they were small. 
42 Jeremy Atack, "Returns to Scale in Antebellum United States Manufacturing", Explorations in 
Economic History, 14, 4 (October, 1977), pp. 337-59. 
43 Using Atack's Table 2, the industries are meat packing, distilleries, cotton textiles, woolen 
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Smallness may have handicapped regional transportation systems as well. 
With the possible exception of coal, regional commodities were not shipped in 
sufficient volume to support bulk transportation technology of the kind used on 
the Great Lakes.44 The geography of the continent made it difficult for Halifax 
and Saint John to attract the large volume of freight needed to justify the 
modern material handling equipment or to become a home base for ocean 
liners.45 A similar point might be made about land transportation. Railways 
such as the Intercolonial carried surprisingly small volumes of freight, and this 
must have made it difficult to reduce costs using the new railway technology of 
large cars and long trains.46 
Another hypothesis entertained by staple theorists is that the small size and 
slow growth of primary sector income undermined the local demand for manufac-
tures and hence the growth of industry. Census-based estimates confirm that 
farm family income was lower in the Maritimes; this affected the demand for 
manufactures in a variety of ways.47 Limited income-earning opportunities in 
the primary sector undoubtedly spurred out-migration by young Maritime men 
and women. The local demand for durable goods would have been stronger if 
the level of primary production had supported greater capital formation in 
primary production and transportation. Moreover, income earned by rural 
families was an important potential market for factory-made consumer goods.48 
The various links between the primary sector and industrial demand complement 
input price and scale considerations in the analysis of slow Maritime industrial 
beginning in the pre-Confederation era. By 1870 New Brunswick was relatively 
industrialized but, as we have seen, its manufacturing grew slowly in subsequent 
decades. Nova Scotia industry was quite anaemic in 1870 but it expanded 
quickly during the following 20 years. Neither Maritime province was able to 
match the dramatic acceleration experienced elsewhere in Canada after 1890. 
The pattern of growth presumably reflected the distinctive characteristics of 
Maritime industry. By and large factories were smaller and operated at a lower 
goods, men's clothing, millinery, furniture, tanneries, boots and shoes, sheet metal, agricultural 
implements, wagons and carriages. The exceptions appear to be bakeries, flour milling, saw 
milling, tobacco manufacture and engine building. 
44 J. Laurent, "Trade, Transportation and Technology: The American Great Lakes, 1866-1910", 
Journal of Transport History, 4 (March 1983), pp. 1-24; Sam H. Williamson, "The Growth of 
the Great Lakes as a Major Transportation Resource", Research in Economic History, 2 (1977), 
pp. 103-183. 
45 Saunders, The Economic History, pp. 21, 27. 
46 Cruikshank, "The Transportation Revolution". 
47 Inwood and Irwin, "Inter-regional Differences". 
48 Higher primary sector incomes also would have made available greater savings for investment 
in manufacturing. I do not dwell on this mechanism because capital, like entrepreneurship, was 
relatively mobile between regions. There is no evidence of a failure to undertake sound business 
opportunities within the region because of scarce capital or entrepreneurship. 
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Table Ten 
The Manufacturing Share of Commodity Production 
Nova Scotia 
New Brunswick 
Quebec 
Ontario 
Inwood-Irwin 
1870 
.29 
.37 
.38 
.32 
1890 
.39 
.46 
.52 
.45 
Green 
1890 
.36 
.35 
.47 
.40 
1910 
.34 
.42 
.55 
.49 
SOURCE: Kris Inwood and Jim Irwin, "Inter-regional Differences in Canadian 
Commodity Output in 1870: Preliminary Estimates", paper presented to the 
17th Conference on the Use of Quantitative Methods in Canadian Economic 
History, October 1990 and Alan Green, Regional Aspects of Canada 's Economic 
Growth (Toronto, 1971), Appendix B. The Inwood-Irwin estimates are based on 
a regional decomposition of M.C. Urquhart's new national income estimates for 
Canada; see M.C. Urquhart, "New Estimates of Gross National Product, 
Canada, 1870 to 1926, in S. Engerman and R. Gallman, eds., Long-Term 
Factors in Amercian Economic Growth (Chicago, 1986), pp. 9-88. Green 
follows an earlier estimating methodology used by O. J. Firestone, Canada's 
Economic Development, 1867-1953 (London, 1958). 
capital-labour ratio in the Maritimes. Household production survived much 
later. Factor productivity and wages were lower. Relative profitability also 
declined in New Brunswick between 1870 and 1910 and in Nova Scotia between 
1890 and 1910. 
These distinctive characteristics of Maritime manufacturing became more 
pronounced between 1870 and 1910. Their early visibility in 1870, however, adds 
to the evidence of slow pre-Confederation growth and undermines the idea that 
Confederation marked a major turning point in regional development. Indeed, a 
more significant turning point may have been the onset of the wheat boom 
during the late 1890s. Maritime manufacturing continued to grow at a steady 
pace during this period but in so doing it missed out on the biggest boom in 
Canadian history. 
The staple theory provides a simple locational explanation for the Maritime 
failure to capture linkages from western settlement. Among other factors, 
transportation costs to the west were lower from southern Ontario than from the 
Maritimes. Structuralists, on the other hand, might cite the influence of Central 
Canadian control over capital markets, tariffs and transportation. A comprehen-
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sive explanation for the salient characteristics of Maritime industrial development 
is likely to require some consideration of hypotheses drawn from the staple 
tradition as well as influences associated with political and financial control. 
It may be helpful to view Maritime industry in the context of American and 
British industrialization. European industrial success in the 19th century involved 
the intensive use of craft labour. This model was difficult to adopt in the high-
wage North American environment, and especially so in a corner of the continent 
relatively remote from the larger centres of innovation and fashion. The literature 
on North American growth, on the other hand, has tended to emphasize the 
effect of abundant natural resources and an expanding frontier; Gavin Wright 
argues that natural resources were the key to success even in the manufacturing 
sector.49 The American model was difficult to adopt in regions such as the 
Maritimes with a weak resource endowment. Was there a third alternative, a 
distinctive Maritime strategy for industrial success? It would seem not, or at any 
rate if some alternative existed, history has not revealed it to us. 
One final question concerns the relative importance of manufacturing within 
the wider economy. Manufacturing largely was ignored by an earlier generation 
of Maritime historians working in the staple theory tradition. One important 
contribution of the structuralist literature has been to correct this imbalance and 
draw attention to the phenomenon of arrested industrialization east of Montreal. 
We are now aware that manufacturing evolved along distinctive lines in Canada's 
thinly settled eastern periphery. Nevertheless, the modern fascination with 
industrial growth should not lead us to equate industrialization with economic 
development, or at least not without careful thought. It is not obvious that 
manufacturing growth is essential for satisfactory social and economic develop-
ment.50 Some economies manage to support a growing population at higher and 
higher incomes through the judicious exploitation of natural resources and the 
efficient supply of services. Recent discussions of the 19th century rural household 
have reminded us that regional development ultimately depends upon individual 
and family struggles for survival and betterment.51 For an individual household, the 
nearby presence of factory employment provided a useful alternative, but it was 
not the only option. Income earned in primary production or the service sector 
49 Gavin Wright, "The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-1940", American Economic 
Review, LXXX, 4 (September 1990), pp. 651-68. 
50 Indeed, some would argue that fast industrialization breeds increased income inequality and 
poverty. For an introduction to this literature see Cynthia Taft Morris and Irma Adelman, 
Comparative Patterns of Economic Development, 1850-1914 (Baltimore, 1988) and Ben Polak 
and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Poverty, Policy and Industrialization: Lessons from the Distant 
Past", World Bank Working Paper WPS 645, April 1991. 
51 Rusty Bittermann, "The H ierarchy of the Soil: Land and Labour in a 19th Century Cape Breton 
Community", Acadiensis, XVIII, 1 (Autumn 1988), pp. 33-55; Rosemary Ommer, "The Truck 
System in Gaspé, 1822-77", Acadiensis, XIX, 1 (Autumn 1989), pp. 91-114. 
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was for many families as helpful as the same level of income earned in 
manufacturing. The manifest ability of Maritime families to survive and in some 
cases to prosper in the absence of industrialization provides a useful caution to 
the modern scholarly passion for smokestacks. 
